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                 BACK TO THE FUTURE: 
        THREE CIVIL WARS AND THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
     In the post-l945 era, civil wars have been the 
predominant form of armed conflict.  Yet, while it is the 
job of the United Nations Security Council to 'determine 
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression', and to proceed to 'maintain 
or restore international peace and security' (l), this 
power has been utilised rarely with regard to an armed 
conflict occurring within the territorial confines of a 
single state.  Instead, in the vast majority of cases, 
modern civil wars have been left to be solved through 
regional arrangements, or within domestic state confines. 
     On the other hand, the nineteenth century community 
of nations had developed a law of neutrality to guide 
international relations should war break out.  When the 
American Civil War (April l86l - April l865) erupted (2), 
neutrality was adopted by most third states towards the 
conflict.  This legal regime allowed states to prevent 
the war's spread to Europe, and to continue peaceful 
trade relations with each of the warring parties. 
     The law of neutrality was effectively modified 
during World War I, primarily due to the economic and 
technical nature of that major conflict.  The Covenant of 
the League of Nations, adopted by the Paris Conference on 
28 April l9l9, was in turn an attempt to curtail the use 
of force in international relations. (3)  Thus, when the 
Spanish Civil War (July l936 - March l939) erupted, many 
states followed a policy of non-intervention (4), rather 
than of neutrality in the face of a belligerency.  In 
other words, the law of neutrality was, strictly 
speaking, not considered to be applicable. 
     In view of the central political authority wielded 
by the U.N. Organisation, the purpose of this article is 
to compare nineteenth and twentieth century mechanisms to 
contain war and, in particular, domestic armed 
conflicts.  It is hoped that, by briefly examining 
international strategies utilised over these two 
centuries to contain war, some useful perspective will 
arise regarding the maintenance of a post-Cold War peace. 
(5)  For instance, the law of neutrality was developed by 
sovereign states to apply principally between them, yet 
it proved applicable to the American Civil War.  The 
post-l945 international community, on the other hand, has 
experienced difficulty in co-ordinating policy with 
regard to domestic armed conflicts.  Thus, any survival 
of traditional neutrality law is of central importance to 
this discussion. 
     A preliminary point, however, must be that the 
nineteenth century law of neutrality was developed during 
a time in which war was not prohibited. (6)  On the 
contrary, war was, among other things, a source of legal 
effects. (7)  The belligerents were equal in law, and 
victory could change the law.  Once purely formal 
requirements for waging war between 'civilised' nations 
were met and observed, such as observing the laws and 
customs of war, a state of belligerency was recognized by 
foreign states, after which the law of neutrality 
applied. (8)  The law of neutrality allowed a degree of 
friendly relations to continue between the belligerents 
and a neutral state, so long as the neutral aided neither 
party to the conflict in its war effort. 
     Thus, the law of neutrality formed a vital part of 
the laws of war.  When the Southern Confederate states 
seceded from the North, or Union, states in l86l, and 
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln blockaded many Confederate 
ports (9), belligerency was recognised, and the law of 
neutrality observed, by most foreign states because of 
the nature and extent of the hostilities.  Most 
importantly, the recognition of a state of belligerency 
through the utilisation of the law of neutrality was not 
a recognition of Southern Confederate independence, which 
never occurred. (l0) 
     The League of Nations, and the Pact of Paris (ll), 
were attempts early this century to alter the legality of 
waging war.  Neutrality law, as a point of reference for 
the international community, fell into desuetude, as did 
the laws of war generally (l2), as 'no member of the 
League of Nations is ever justified in adopting a policy 
of neutrality toward a state which is violating the 
Covenant'. (l3)  Thus, a collective policy of non-
intervention was observed during the Spanish Civil War 
(l4), the attempted containment of which marked what was 
felt at the time to be a triumph for a co-ordinated 
international approach to the question of belligerent 
rights, and the maintenance of peace. (l5) 
     Post-l945, the interstate threat or use of 
aggressive force is largely prohibited.  When assessing 
the legality of the use of interstate force, a two-tiered 
scrutiny is utilised:  that of the jus contra bellum and 
the jus in bello. (l6)  Further, in view of the many 
'internationalised' aspects of wars of self-
determination, this double scrutiny has also been of 
growing importance to 'domestic' armed conflicts. (l7)  
Thus, judicial and U.N. General Assembly interpretations 
of post-l945 rules on the use of armed force imply that 
foreign assistance afforded to a non-state party engaged 
in a high-intensity armed civil strife may no longer 
automatically constitute aggression. (l8)   
     Thus, the nineteenth century law of neutrality is 
viewed by some commentators as superceded by the 
collective security provisions of the U.N. Charter (l9), 
with the option of League 'non-intervention' reduced 
should the U.N. Security Council act or permit a regional 
arrangement to act to resolve a situation of domestic 
armed conflict. (20)  In any event, third states in the 
modern era cannot consider themselves bound by the law of 
neutrality (2l), but interest in neutrality law 
persists.  Its continuing relevance is assured, if only 
due to the use of the blocking vote in the Security 
Council (22) throughout the post-l945 Cold War, and an 
international climate of constant war and preparing for 
war.  For example, states protect their nationals and 
property during civil armed conflicts by observing 
aspects of traditional neutrality law, e.g., by abiding 
by neutral rules against the premature recognition of 
independence of a rebelling faction within a state. (23) 
     In order to explore these many issues, the structure 
of this discussion is as follows.  The origins and 
development of the law of neutrality are first examined.  
The crucial relevance of neutrality law to third-state 
action during the American Civil War, and the Spanish 
Civil War, is then outlined.  Post-l945 provisions 
regarding the use of threat of force in international 
life, developments in the laws of war, and the survival 
of aspects of neutrality law, are then reviewed in order 
to gauge their post-Cold War efficacy during the 
dissolution conflicts of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (June l99l - November l995), and, in 
particular, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
  
II.  THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 
     In general terms, modern European wars were fought 
for a 'just cause' until the sixteenth century.  This 
meant basically that force was justified if used to 
rectify the breach of a pre-existing legal state of 
affairs. (24)  A tendency to characterise unilaterally 
the 'just' basis of a conflict however made the 
adversaries unequal in rights, and the types of harm that 
a 'just' (or Christian) belligerent could employ to 
punish the wicked knew few restrictions. 
     With the discovery of the New World, and of the new 
western civilisations, clerical disagreement over what 
was 'just' led to greater governmental interest in the 
laws and customs of warfare.  The 'just' bases for waging 
war had become less clear; instead, the regulation of the 
use of force gained in importance (25), the result being 
that a state could release itself from all international 
law obligations by a declaration of war, except those 
obligations which related to war's conduct. (26)  States 
which wished to remain outside of a conflict, and to 
continue friendly trade unhampered, could only ensure the 
continuation of such peacetime legal rights by adopting a 
stance of neutrality.  Neutral practice varied, however, 
and the community of nations adopted principles of armed 
neutrality in l780 and l800. (27) 
  
     A.  The Development of the Principles of Armed 
Neutrality 
     F.E. Smith, writing in l900, notes that 'the law of 
neutrality differs from other branches of international 
law in the comparative certainty with which its rules may 
be stated'. (28)  In brief, there were two principles.  
First, neutrals were entitled to continue peaceful trade 
during a war.  Secondly, belligerents were entitled, for 
wartime purposes, to monitor certain forms of such trade 
in order to prevent the delivery of prohibited 
contraband. (29) 
     As trade was conducted publicly, and privately, the 
law of neutrality involved state-to-state relations, and 
the relations between belligerent governments and neutral 
individuals.  By the late eighteenth century, theory and 
practice both indicated that the duty of neutral states 
was to remain impartial, although it was common for 
neutrals to supply troops to one of two belligerents. 
(30)  The greater conformity in state behaviour though 
was in relation to neutral territory rather than maritime 
practice (3l), and it was this latter area which led to 
the adoption of the principles of armed neutrality in 
l780. 
     The background to the l780 principles is briefly as 
follows.  The Peace of Paris in l763 had left Great 
Britain in possession of a huge colonial empire in North 
America.  After its thirteen colonies declared their 
independence as sovereign states on 4 July l776, forming 
a confederation for their mutual defence, the French 
court acknowledged this independence.  On 6 February 
l778, France made two treaties with the new republics 
(32), which it notified to Britain, whilst denying that 
the legality of the independence was the affair of 
France.  France then complained of British cruisers 
interfering with its lawful commerce with the new 
republics.  Britain found itself faced with a potential 
alliance between European maritime powers and its former 
colonies, and sought assistance from The Netherlands and 
Russia, each of which declined the request. 
     Russia and Spain then found their sea trade was 
being hampered by Britain.  On advice, the Russian 
Empress Catherine II announced to the European powers 
that she would not allow their wars to harm Russian 
trade.  On 26 February l780, she communicated the 
following principles to the courts of London, Versailles, 
and Madrid:   
     (l) neutral vessels may navigate freely;  
(2) enemy goods carried in neutral ships are protected, 
apart from illegal contraband (33);  
(3) the definition of contraband contained in the tenth 
and eleventh articles of her l766 treaty of commerce 
with Britain would be applied to all the powers at 
war (34); 
 (4) a blockade must be effective; and  
(5) these principles would apply to the adjudication of 
prizes. (35) 
     On 9 July l780, Denmark and Russia concluded a 
convention of armed neutrality to maintain these 
principles.  Sweden acceded on 9 September l780; the new 
American states, on 7 April l78l; Prussia, on 8 May l78l; 
Austria, on 9 October l78l; the Netherlands, in l78l; and 
the king of the two Sicilies, on l0 February l783. (36)  
Britain, France, and Spain each communicated that it 
already observed these known principles of the law of 
nations. 
     The next twenty years were fraught with differing 
assertions of the maritime rules omitted from the l780 
Treaty.  In particular, the 'duty' of neutral vessels to 
submit to visit by a belligerent searching for illegal 
contraband was problematic, as this could result in a 
fleet being stopped for visit and search by a single 
privateer.  Due to this, and other, diplomatic problems, 
the Russian Emperor Paul proposed a convention to the 
northern powers of Denmark, Prussia, and Sweden, to renew 
the l780 neutrality rules and to develop mutual defence 
measures. (37)  Three treaties were signed at St. 
Petersburg on l6 December l800. (38) 
     This 'Second Armed Neutrality' lasted a year, after 
which Britain and Russia signed a convention on l7 June 
l80l for 'an invariable determination of their principles 
upon the rights of neutrality ...'. (39)  Denmark acceded 
to this convention in October, and Sweden, in March 
l802.  The l80l treaty codified pre-existing rights, and 
contained new conventional law between the contracting 
parties.  The three northern powers conceded 'free ships, 
free goods' (40), and search only by public ships of 
war.  Britain conceded points regarding colonial and 
coasting trade, blockades, and mode of search, yielding 
to Russia the limitation of contraband to military 
stores. 
     Subsequent developments of note in the law of 
neutrality include, for present purposes, the U.S. 
Foreign Enlistment Act, passed by Congress on 20 April 
l8l8, which was intended to prevent the enlistment of 
U.S. citizens in foreign wars.  The U.S. Act was soon 
followed by the British Foreign Enlistment Act of l8l9. 
(4l)  By the outbreak of the Crimean War in l854, rules 
on the capture of property at sea were once again in need 
of harmonisation.  The participants in that war agreed 
they would not authorise privateering.  When the 
representatives of seven states (42) assembled at the 
Congress of Paris in l856 to conclude terms of peace, 
they adopted the Declaration of Paris.  The Declaration 
incorporated into international law the following 
agreements:   
(l) privateering was abolished;  
(2) free ships made free goods;  
(3) neutral goods on enemy ships must not be 
appropriated; and  
(4) blockades must be effective, in the sense of 
preventing access to the enemy coast. (43) 
  
     B.  The Operation of the Law of Neutrality 
     As previously noted, neutrality law pre-supposed a 
war between sovereign entities and the equal treatment of 
sovereign belligerents by neutral third states.  Thus, 
states A and B, at war with each other, would be treated 
equally by neutral state C.  By maintaining neutrality 
towards the belligerents, state C could ensure a level of 
continued friendly relations and trade.  Where neutrality 
was breached, state A or state B could attack offending 
state C.  Thus, neutrals did not allow their territory to 
be used by a belligerent for purposes of the war effort 
(44), which could include the fitting out and equipping 
of belligerent vessels 'to order' for use in war.  It 
would also be a breach of neutrality for a neutral 
government to loan money to a belligerent. (45) 
     Private trade in contraband and blockade-running 
were discouraged but any prohibition was relative rather 
than absolute; isolated cases were rarely imputable to a 
government which observed proper precautions.  A neutral 
state could permit private traffic, leaving the 
belligerent government to confront the offending 
individual. (46)  The ordinary penalty for carriage of 
contraband was confiscation of the cargo and/or vessel, 
which became a 'prize' upon capture.  Such captures 
required legal confirmation by a prize court, which the 
admiralties of maritime belligerents were obliged to 
institute.  Belligerent maritime rights of visit and 
search were also adjudicated, as well as violations of 
the many varieties of blockade. (47)  For example, a 
'pacific' blockade was considered a pre-belligerent act, 
falling short of war.  A blockade 'proper' indicated 
belligerency, and had to be effective.  An ineffective 
blockade was termed a 'paper blockade'.  The question, 
then, was whether the blockade was intended for strictly 
military purposes, or to carry on a war against trade. 
(48) 
  
     C.  Neutrality l86l - l865 
     Despite such seeming clarity in the rules, neutral 
third states had first to decide whether a belligerency 
existed (49), because a decision to recognise 
belligerency brought neutrality law into operation.  A 
proclamation of neutrality constituted a legal 
acknowledgment of a state of war.  At this point, the 
rights and duties of both belligerent and neutral were 
exercisable.  There was generally no 'right' to a 
recognition of belligerency, but it usually followed from 
a de facto state of affairs which disturbed neutral trade 
and diplomatic relations. 
     As regards neutrality law and civil wars, a domestic 
armed conflict could be identified as a state of 
belligerency either by the government against which the 
rebels fought or by third states.  Prior to that time, 
the conflict could be characterised as an insurrection, 
or a revolt.  The line of demarcation between revolt and 
full-scale civil war looked to the way in which the war 
was fought, and in particular, whether there was evidence 
of 'military science, tactics, and regulations, with the 
winning of specific military objectives as the immediate 
goal of the fighting'. (50) 
  
     l.  Foreign recognition 
     The American Civil War presented the community of 
nations with such a de facto state of affairs.  Foreign 
recognitions of belligerency were provoked by President 
Lincoln's blockade of the Southern ports on l9 April 
l86l.  The U.S. government feared the foreign recognition 
of Confederate independence, and asserted throughout the 
war that the conflict was at most an insurgency.  The 
U.S. felt that outside recognitions of belligerency - in 
particular, by Britain - were both premature, and an 
interference in U.S. domestic affairs.  However, while 
the many proclamations of neutrality (5l) led to equal 
treatment of the belligerents by the community of 
nations, the emotive issue of Southern slavery prevented 
any international consensus regarding Confederate 
sovereignty. (52)  However, strategic, and economic, 
considerations such as industrial links with Southern 
cotton, and concern over the territorial integrity of 
Canada, led to some sympathy towards the Confederate 
states, which had formed a government and commanded 
territory, were culturally and economically distinct from 
the Northern states, and had forces which observed the 
laws of war. (53) 
     The many proclamations of neutrality should have 
resulted in the continuation of friendly trade relations 
between the belligerents and neutral nations.  However, 
as the U.S. refused to view the war as a belligerency, 
the rules did not always operate as expected.  The U.S. 
interfered continuously with 'legitimate' Confederate 
trade, and it  protested throughout the war, to Britain 
in particular, about foreign sources of Confederate 
procurement. 
  
     2.  The growing importance of neutral territory 
     A crucial aspect of the operation of the law of 
neutrality was that the neutral duty not to supply war 
material to a belligerent did not necessarily extend to 
private commercial transactions by private citizens.  For 
example, the U.S. protested to Britain, without 
justification in international law at the time, regarding 
private shipments of arms and munitions to the South.  
Problems also persisted in distinguishing between acts 
neutral states should restrain, particularly with regard 
to the sale of ships.  Uncertainty about neutral state 
responsibility for private activities in turn 
strengthened the argument that the duty of impartiality 
should extend to state control over private commercial 
activities such as shipbuilding performed 'to order' for 
belligerent naval operations. (54) 
     British shipbuilders were thus under no legal 
obligation to inquire into the use to which a vessel 
might be put, and carried on an open trade with the 
Confederate states. (55)  By l862, there was no doubt 
that Confederate cruisers were being built in British 
territory.  As the neutral was concerned only to see that 
at the time of leaving the territory a ship was 
'incapable of attack and defence' (56), English 
Commissioners of Customs assumed that a ship was prima 
facie the subject of innocent merchandise.  This was a 
rule of the community of nations.  As Justice Story had 
said in l822, '(t)here is nothing in the law of nations 
that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels as 
well as munitions of war to foreign ports for sale.  It 
is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to 
prohibit ...'. (57) 
     However, the U.S. remained opposed to this trade, 
and in the notorious case of the ship 'The Alabama' (58), 
drew British attention to the fact that this vessel was 
intended for the Confederate states (albeit indirectly), 
and demanded her arrest.  The vessel escaped from 
Liverpool without arms or Confederate crew, and the law 
officers of the Crown advised that the Foreign Enlistment 
Act should be used to prevent a re-occurrence of this 
embarrassment.  The provisions of that statute, however, 
did not cover equipment which gave no means of attack or 
defence, and addiitonal vessels managed to escape.  The 
U.S. proposed arbitrating 'The Alabama' claims in l863, 
without success. (59) 
     After the war, the U.S. made a heavy claim against 
the British government, claiming indemnity for increased 
rates of insurance caused by the destructiveness of these 
vessels, the transfer of the American carrying trade to 
England, and the prolongation of the war by at least two 
years. (60)  The British, too, had claims.  On 8 May 
l87l, the parties entered into the Treaty of Washington 
for the purpose of arbitrating their differences. (6l)  
The rules of neutral duty were the law of the tribunal, 
which opened in Geneva in l87l. (62)  On l4 September 
l872, the arbitrators awarded $l5,500,000 to the U.S., in 
damages payable by Britain. (63) 
  
     D.  The Laws of War, and the Hague Rules 
     The many legal and financial consequences which 
flowed from the application of neutrality law during the 
American Civil War made subsequent recognitions of 
belligerency rare. (64)  States were increasingly 
hesitant to be drawn into the debate over the content of 
neutral duties, or to risk war by defending private 
interests.  Nevertheless, the l87l Geneva arbitration 
marked the beginning of a consensus that the waging of 
war between 'civilised' nations could be made more 
certain, as well as more humane.   
     In particular, the American Civil War contributed to 
this consensus through the promulgation of the Lieber 
Code (66) to the Northern Union troops.  The Lieber Code 
in turn provided a ready format for subsequent projects 
to codify the international laws of war, most notably, 
the Brussels Conference of l874 (66), the Oxford Manual 
of l880 (67), and the two Hague Peace Conferences of l899 
and l907. (68)   
     Both in l899 and l907 'the desire to serve, even in 
this extreme case (of war), the interest of humanity and 
the ever progressive needs of civilisation' was 
expressed. (69)  After the Franco-Prussian War (l870 - 
l), the idea was further espoused that neutrality should 
be considered as part of the law of peace as much as, or 
rather than the law of war, because this body of 
international law allowed neutral states to counter 
tyranny, and safeguard their independence. (70) 
     The South African (l900) and Russo-Japanese (l904 - 
5) Wars contributed to the inclusion of neutrality law in 
the deliberations of the Second Hague Peace Conference in 
l907. (7l)  This resulted in Hague Convention V 
respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and 
persons in war on land, and Hague Convention XIII 
respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers in 
naval war. (72)  The neutrality rules developed in three 
parts:  rules imposing duties on neutral states and 
belligerents, rules imposing duties on neutral states, 
and rules imposing duties on belligerents. (73)  New 
conditions in international life were further signalled 
with the establishment of a Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at the Second Hague Peace Conference, where 
states could arbitrate their grievances. 
     By no means were these codifications viewed as 
complete, but they represented an effort to codify what 
was generally viewed as customary practice.  The new 
rules contained some elements of innovation, such as the 
proposal in Hague Convention XII for an international 
prize court to serve as a court of appeal from decisions 
of the prize courts of belligerents (74); however, this 
secured no ratifications.  Hague Convention VII relative 
to the conversion of merchantships into warships, and 
Hague Convention XI relative to certain restrictions on 
the exercise of the right of capture, were indirectly of 
importance to the law of neutrality. (75) 
     In order to find a common basis for prize courts, a 
naval conference met in London in l908, and in l909 
produced the Declaration of London concerning the law of 
naval war. (76)  Although never signed, the belligerents 
in the Turco-Italian War (l9ll) largely complied with the 
Declaration, as did the U.S., Germany, and Austria-
Hungary during World War I, until July l9l6, the point by 
which Britain had so restricted the application of the 
Declaration as to make it inoperable. (77) 
  
III.  THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE PACT OF PARIS 
     The substance of neutrality law was damaged heavily 
during World War I, and in particular, by the demands 
made on neutral states to participate in what was seen at 
the time as a 'total war'.  It is perhaps not surprising 
therefore that neutrality came to be viewed as 'not 
morally justified'. (76)  Politis notes that the rules 
were transgressed from the beginning of hostilities, 
particularly those relating to maritime operations. (79)  
The economic demands of a total, mechanised war led to 
longer lists of prohibited contraband; the rule requiring 
'effective' blockades was competely abandoned, and 
automatic contact mines decimated neutral shipping, 
further threatening the right of states to choose to 
abstain from the hostilities. (80)  New developments in 
technology and military science meant that 'civilised' 
nations could no longer observe an impartial law of 
neutrality which could not safeguard world order. 
     These unprecedented incursions into neutrality law 
not only modified the laws of war, but also those of 
peace, or of non-belligerency, and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations reflected these incursions.  Although 
members of the League did not renounce the right to 
resort to war, the jurisdiction of the League Council 
extended to any dispute likely to disturb the peace. 
(8l)  The Pact of Paris of l928 (82) strengthened the 
League preference for mediation and collective security 
(83) by altering the status of aggressive war in 
international law. (84)  This in turn altered much of the 
political rational for a law of neutrality. 
  
     A.  Neutrality as Defence 
     From l936, if not well before, states were aware 
that the legal limitations on resort to war were being 
disregarded. (85)  It is sufficient for present purposes 
to note the re-militarisation of the Rhineland by Germany 
in l936, Germany's annexation of Austria in March l938, 
the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in September 
l938, the occupation of Prague by German troops, the 
incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich as 
'protectorates', both in March l939, and the German 
invasion of Poland, in September of that same year. (86) 
     Rather than an increase in international vigilance 
to forestall the outbreak of aggression, attention 
focused defensively on peace.  The traditional law of 
neutrality maintained an existence in the new moral 
order, but the dilution caused to its content of 
abstention and impartiality resulted in a growing 
distinction between a law of neutrality which was 
applicable during war, and a stance of neutrality 
pronounced during a time of peace.  Thus, when civil war 
broke out in Spain in l936, individual state 'peacetime' 
neutrality was of paramount importance.  The U.S. enacted 
legislation in l936 and l939 to place wide restrictions 
on citizen trade with belligerent countries (87); Belgium 
and The Netherlands affirmed their attitudes of 
neutrality; Switzerland strengthened its own.  The 
Scandinavian states followed suit, re-affirming their 
position through a code of neutrality rules in l938.  In 
l939, a General Declaration of Neutrality was adopted by 
twenty-one American Republics, including the U.S.. (88) 
  
     B.  Non-Intervention 
     The Spanish army revolted on l7 July l936 against a 
newly elected Popular Front government which had gained 
power after a closely fought contest.  However, despite 
appealing for assistance, as it was legally entitled to 
do, the new Spanish government was met with a Non-
Intervention Agreement which Britain, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France entered 
into on 7 August l936, and which was signed ultimately by 
twenty-seven European states. (89)  Germany signed the 
Agreement on l7 August, but not the Preamble.  Italy did 
likewise on 2l August. (90)  The joint policy was in 
effect an embargo, thereby avoiding the problem of 
recognising belligerency. (9l)  This meant that the 
rights and duties of neutrality were not called into 
play, and in particular, that the right to stop and 
search maritime shipping to search for wartime contraband 
was not recognised.  
     The Non-Intervention Agreement thus created an 
anomaly.  The Agreement neither contemplated a 
recognition of belligerency, nor that aid could be given 
to the legitimate Spanish government.  On the other hand, 
by attempting a co-ordinated embargo over public and 
private trade, the Non-Intervention Agreement went 
further in the process of an attempt to contain and 
shorten war than had the abstentionist law of 
neutrality.  The irony perhaps is that the absence of an 
European recognition of belligerency prevented the 
legitimate exercise of neutral rights and duties by the 
Popular Front government.  This meant the government 
could not exercise its right of maritime surveillance 
over the supply of contraband, which handicap facilitated 
assistance reaching the rebels led by General Franco from 
those countries which chose either not to implement the 
Agreement, or which did so only partially.   
     Further complicating the matter, the operation of 
the Non-Intervention system was partial, as well as 
regional.  For example, the U.S. followed the European 
lead.  Mexico objected strongly to the policy and aided 
the Popular Front government, insisting that covert 
German and Italian assistance to the Spanish rebels 
constituted an aggression in breach of the League of 
Nations Covenant.  Russia aided the Spanish government 
secretly. (92)   
     Germany and Italy recognised the rebel forces of 
General Franco as the legitimate government on l8 
November l936, affording full diplomatic relations.  
Republican forces finally capitulated on 3l March l939, 
in large part due to German and Italian aid in the form 
of war material and troops, which included entire 
fighting divisions, armaments, planes, and technicians.  
It could thus be argued that the political realities 
which underpinned the faulty and partial operation of the 
Non-Intervention Agreement also helped to facilitate the 
rise of European Fascism.  As for the traditional law of 
neutrality, it technically survived the Spanish Civil War 
in legal commentary which largely denied its relevance to 
the situation. (93) 
  
     C.  The Covenant and Civil Strife 
     It was clear by reference to action taken by the 
League of Nations during the Spanish Civil War that 
insurrection and civil war were not merely domestic or 
regional problems.  The League of Nations publicised 
facts, and condemned foreign intervention, indiscriminate 
aerial bombing and torpedoing.  It supported initiatives 
to end the confict.  Further, the Covenant's general war 
prevention functions provided it with some jurisdiction.  
Articles 3 and 4 of the League Covenant permitted 'any 
matter .. affecting the peace of the world' to be 
discussed.  Article l0 empowered the Council in cases of 
aggression to advise measures; Article ll referred to 
'war or threat of war'; and Articles l2 and l5 referred 
to 'any dispute likely to lead to a rupture'.  
Nevertheless, procedure under Article ll was not 
exhausted, and Articles l2, l3 and l5 were 'hardly 
tapped'. (94) 
     Spain first appealed to the League of Nations in 
Spetember l936, predicting that 'the blood-stained soil 
of Spain is already in fact the battlefield of a world 
war'. (95)  However, much of the League's inaction 
illustrates the complete dependence of League decision-
making on its member states.  From early l936, Spanish 
internal affairs reflected the growing continental 
hegemonic struggle between Communism, Fascism, and 
Democracy.  The refusal of the Agreement states either to 
aid the Spanish government, or to proclaim the rights and 
duties of neutrality through a recognition of 
belligerency allowed attention to be focused instead on 
the respective merits of the political ideologies in 
conflict, and Germany and Italy in particular breached 
the spirit of the Non-Intervention Agreement with 
impunity.  Thus, it could be argued that the realities of 
international reaction to the Spanish civil war were a 
foretaste of the reappearance of the 'just' war mentality 
which was to characterise World War II, and its aftermath 
at the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo. 
     This explicit politicisation of international 
reaction to an armed conflict in turn decreased attention 
paid to the means and methods by which the war was 
fought, thereby implying that the laws of war were of 
secondary importance.  In other words, as a situation of 
war was not recognised as such by the international 
community, international scrutiny of the implementation 
of the laws and customs of war was reduced.  As a result, 
there was little incentive to, or pressure on, the 
belligerents to wage the war in any remotely humane 
manner.  The restraint codified inter alia by the Hague 
Conventions was lacking, and the types of harm inflicted 
on notional 'unjust' adversaries during the Spanish Civil 
War knew few limits. 
  
IV.  NEUTRALITY AND THE U.N. CHARTER 
     From l780 to codification at the Hague in l907 (96), 
the law of neutrality constituted one mechanism through 
which neutral states could preserve a largely 
uninterrupted commerce, and confine war.  The need for 
such a mechanism is subsequently reflected in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the 
l94l Atlantic Charter (97), and the U.N. Charter.  Yet, 
these many instruments do not apply expressly to civil 
wars. (98)  Further, no provision in the U.N. Charter 
indicates expressly whether or not the law of neutrality 
survives.  The issue whether neutrality law remains an 
option (99), at least until the collective security 
system contained in the U.N. Charter is employed, must, 
then, be raised. 
     With the advent of the U.N. Charter, the 
international community acquired a legal framework 
through which to guide global issues, including those of 
peace and war.  While the Charter prohibits the 
interstate use or threat of aggressive armed force in 
Article 2(4), it is of interest that the laws of armed 
conflict were modernised in l949 and l977.  The 
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL) 
(l00) today contains limited aspects of traditional 
neutrality law, and extends to civil, or domestic, armed 
conflict at least minimal rules. 
     These developments will now be discussed, after 
which the efficacy of the modern prohibition on the 
interstate use of force, as developed in tandem with IHL, 
in co-ordinating international behaviour during an armed 
conflict will be assessed by use of the example of the 
recently resolved armed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
  
     A.  The Post-l945 Prohibition of the Use or Threat 
of  
          Armed Force 
     In l928, the international community attempted to 
proclaim the illegality of 'wars of aggression' between 
states by means of the Pact of Paris. (l0l)  
Nevertheless, the threat or use of force in interstate 
relations remained controversial until the international 
agreement found in U.N. Charter Article 2(4).  Article 
2(4), in providing that states 'shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, ...' (l02), seeks to guarantee 
the territorial integrity of all states and not just of 
neutral states.  Thus, should state A and state B use 
force against the territory of state C, the territory of 
state A or state B is not automatically open to 
retaliatory attack by state C.  State territory remains 
under the protection of Article 2(4), unless state C can 
make a plausible case for a retaliatory use of force 
under an expansive approach to U.N. Charter Article 5l. 
(l03) 
     Article 5l guarantees to each state the right to use 
individual or collective armed force to repel an 
aggressor until the Security Council can act with regard 
to the situation. (l04)  Thus, third states have the 
right to assist the victim state, if requested, for this 
limited purpose, and need not take the law of neutrality 
into account.  Should state A and state B attack state C, 
state C has the right to defend itself, and to request 
state (or regional authority) D to come to its immediate 
assistance.  An attack against the territory of state A 
or state B by state C (the original 'victim') beyond the 
bare confines of self-defence, however, may constitute a 
further breach of Article 2(4). 
     Strictly speaking, Articles 2(4) and 5l apply to 
states.  Situations of civil armed conflict remain beyond 
the confines of Article 2(4) until a threat to 
international peace and security is posed. (l05)  The 
difficulty of course remains the binding identification 
of an Article 2(4) and/or Article 5l situation. 
  
     B.  The Continued Viability of the Laws of 
Neutrality and          of Armed Conflict 
     The 'non-belligerents' of World War II included 
those states supporting one of the belligerents, as with 
the U.S. Lend-Lease Act. (l06)  This is later reflected 
in U.N. Charter provisions, which permit a distinction 
between types of neutrals:  'permanently neutral' states 
are distinguished from 'non-belligerent powers' through 
the formers' non-participation in U.N. actions, their 
refusal to allow troops to transit through their 
territory, and their appeal to neutral rights in maritime 
warfare. 
     While it is clear that Charter collective security 
provisions supercede neutrality law, except perhaps for 
the permanent neutrals, a level of optional neutrality 
remains, giving rise to the modern legal acceptance of 
terms such as 'benevolent neutrality', 'non-
belligerency', and 'states not party to the hostilities'. 
(l07)  States wishing to maintain friendly relations with 
belligerents have thus been able to do so, particularly 
in view of the general ineffectiveness of Security 
Council decision-making and utilisation of collective 
security mechanism by means such as the blocking vote, 
the recommendation of non-binding measures, or when no 
U.N. action is even requested.  It is at this point that 
the perspectives provided by the traditional law of 
neutrality retain viability.  Nevertheless, within the 
context of U.N. Charter Articles 2(4) and 5l, there is a 
central dilemma for any assessment of the technical 
survival of the law of neutrality:  a declaration of 
neutrality made prior, or subsequent, to U.N. debate 
and/or collective action could legitimate both the 
hostilities and an aggressor. 
     As for post-Charter developments in the laws of 
armed conflict, the experiences of World War II indicated 
a need for their revision.  Today, the laws of armed 
conflict, or IHL, consist of both codified and customary 
international legal obligations, including those rules 
contained in the four Geneva Conventions of l949, and 
their Protocols l and 2 of l977. (l09)  Further, while 
the vast majority of post-l945 armed conflicts have been 
'civil', and propelled by a largely undefined U.N. 
principle of 'the equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples' (l09), the internationalised nature of such 
armed conflicts is recognised in Protocol l, which 
extends the protections of IHL in full to some liberation 
conflicts. (ll0) 
     Limited aspects of neutrality law are carried 
forward into the Geneva revisions.  The respective rights 
and duties of 'neutrals or non-belligerent powers' are 
formally codified in the l949 Geneva Conventions, with 
the more precisely stated 'neutral and other states not 
party to the conflict' contained in Protocol l of l977. 
(lll)  Many Hague rules remain in effect, and neutral 
persons, powers, countries and territory are mentioned. 
(ll2)  What these many provisions cover in essence, 
however, are issues such as the impartial treatment of 
the sick and wounded, hospital ships and medical 
aircraft.  In other words, the limited aspects of 
neutrality law which continue to appear in codified form 
within the laws of armed conflict are mainly humanitarian 
in nature.  This in turn supports the role played by 
neutrality law within the law of peace as much as within 
the laws of war, a characterisation posited initially in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, and codified 
in the Hague instruments of l899 and l907.  
     Despite the legal prohibition found in U.N. Charter 
Article 2(4), IHL law maintains an independent role:  the 
use of armed force is regulated, doing so through 
different levels of rules which are dependent on whether 
there is an international, or a domestic, armed conflict 
in fact.  In other words, the level of implementation of 
IHL turns on the factual issue of whether there exists an 
armed conflict.  If so, implementation of IHL is required 
from the outbreak of hostilities. (ll3)  However, the 
term 'armed conflict' is undefined in IHL instruments, 
and states in the post-l945 era hesitate to view 
outbreaks of armed hostilities as necessitating the 
implementation of IHL, even after U.N. collective 
security mechanisms are engaged. (ll4)  In that there is 
scant recognition of 'war' by states, reference to the 
laws of war, or in the more content-neutral manner in 
which they are known in the U.N. era, of 'armed 
conflict', is rare. 
     The disregard of IHL, or the jus in bello, which can 
result from this hesitation, is, however, anomalous.  
Implementation of IHL does not afford a legal status to 
the parties to the conflict (ll5)  For example, even if 
minimal levels of IHL are initially implemented in a 
'civil' armed conflict, the parties remain free to come 
to agreement regarding more precise IHL obligations 
should the armed conflict develop in intensity and 
duration.  
     Therefore, recognitions of belligerency are 
unnecessary.  IHL does, however, require an assessment of 
the nature of the hostilities in order to refer to the 
appropriate level of rules, whether those which are 
applicable to an international armed conflict (the higher 
level), or those which are applicable to armed conflicts 
not of an international character (minimal).  Thus, 
conformity with the laws of armed conflict is entirely 
compatible with U.N. Charter provisions which provide for 
restraint in the use or threat of interstate armed 
force.  The jus in bello simply obliges the parties to an 
armed conflict to conform their choice of means and 
methods of warfare to IHL provisions, and to afford 
humanitarian treatment to the various categories of 
protected persons. 
  
     C.  Collective Security l99l - 5 
     With the end of the Cold War, it would appear that 
the U.N. was presented with an opportunity to function as 
originally designed.  In particular, the former U.S.S.R. 
superpower, with its Security Council seat altered to the 
name 'Russia', appeared ready to compromise with the West 
on numerous points in exchange for political, logistic, 
and economic support. 
     This premise, along with many other post-Cold War 
assumptions, has been put to the test, however, in one of 
the most problematic armed conflicts ever to face the 
U.N.:  the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  While it is beyond the scope of 
this discussion to detail the causes and events of the 
hostilities which were on-going in the Balkans until 
recently, it is perhaps informative to contrast the 
actions taken by the international community regarding 
the Yugoslav dissolution, with the previous account of 
the law of neutrality. 
  
     l.  An overview 
     Yugoslavia was constructed for political imperatives 
after World War I which were in part attributable to 
support for a pan-Slav union.  Until recently consisting 
of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia), and two 
autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina), Yugoslavia was 
a co-belligerent with Britain during World War II. (ll7)  
However, Yugoslavia was divided within:  the Croats 
supported the Fascists, while the Serbs engaged in a 
fratricidal war fought between a nationalist movement and 
Serb-dominated partisans. 
     After World War II, population transfers took place, 
as they had throughout the centuries, the Serb Ottoman 
tradition maintaining a clear advantage over the other 
groups.  By l992, Slovenia had small minorities of ethnic 
Serbs, Croats and Hungarians.  Croatia had a minority of 
ethnic Serbs which formed local majorities in several 
administrative regions.  Bosnia-Hercegovina had a 
Croatian minority, with the rest of its population 
divided roughly between Muslims and Serbs.  Ethnic Serbs 
formed two-thirds of Serbia's population, into which the 
former autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodian were 
incorporated in l99l (the latter having an Albanian 
majority).  Montenegro had Muslim and Albanian 
minorities.  Macedonia had some Albanians and other 
minorities. (ll8)  Uniquely, perhaps, the former 
Yugoslavia was constructed on a dual concept of 
sovereignty:  the sovereignty of the republics and the 
sovereignty of the nations.  Independence of a republic 
required the agreement of the other republics, and most 
importantly, of the nations comprising it. (ll9) 
     In l9l8, no or little regard was given to the 
region's economic requirements. (l20)  During the years 
of Communist administration, Yugoslavia's economic 
imbalances were controlled through massive state 
control.  The West supported a federal Yugoslavia because 
of the notable economic success achieved by l990. (l2l)  
Nevertheless, with the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe, it was soon evident that a successful management 
of the economy alone could not amount to a political 
strategy. 
     As for the Yugoslav dissolution, Slovenia put 
forward the idea of an 'asymmetric federation' during 
initial discussions on constitutional change in l990. 
(l22)  Serbia, on the other hand, remained committed to a 
unitarist structure.  Slovenia proclaimed legislative 
supremacy on 27 September l990, and voted for 
independence on 23 December, a day after the Croatian 
parliament proclaimed its legislative supremacy in hopes 
of a loose federation with Slovenia.  On 25 June l99l, 
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence.  Two days 
later, the Yugoslav army attacked the Slovene forces.  
Slovenia proclaimed a 'state of war', and appealed for 
international assistance.  By July, hostilities in 
Croatia had broken out, predominantly in Serbian Croat 
areas. 
  
     2.  Embargo and recognition 
     Although the outbreak of hostilities at this early 
date was arguably a matter of domestic concern, the U.S. 
suspended all economic assistance to Yugoslavia in May 
l99l. (l23)  On 5 July, the E.C. banned arms exports to 
Yugoslavia, suspended nearly $l billion in economic aid, 
and considered the formation of 'military interposition 
forces'. (l24)  The U.N. Security Council met, and 
unanimously adopted Resolution 7l3 on 25 September l99l. 
(l25)  The Yugoslav 'crisis' was stated by the Security 
Council to be 'a threat to international peace and 
security', which pronouncement fulfilled the requirements 
of U.N. Charter Article 39 and brought Chapter VII of the 
Charter fully into play.  Resolution 7l3 further provided 
(T)hat all states shall, for the purposes of establishing 
peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately 
implement a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 
Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides 
otherwise following consultation between the 
Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia. 
By late October, European draft sanctions provided for 
the suspension of co-operation agreements and trade 
concessions with Yugoslavia. (l26)   
     Foreign recognition of the independence of the new 
republics was made contingent on '(a)dequate arrangements 
(being) made for the protection of minorities, including 
human righs guarantees and possibly special status for 
certain areas'. (l27)  Serbia refused to accept these 
terms, and the European draft sanctions were 
implemented.  Over Serbia's continuing objections, the 
E.C. then proposed a set of unilateral commitments which 
each republic could assume while working toward 
collective agreement. (l28)  These included, inter alia, 
respect for territorial inviolability, the 'rule of law, 
democracy and human rights', and a guarantee of 'the 
rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities'.  
All Yugoslav republics wishing independence were invited 
to state their desire to comply with these commitments by 
23 December; the issue of recognition would be decided on 
l5 January l992. 
     Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina 
replied affirmatively to the invitation.  Slovenia and 
Croatia were duly recognised.  Macedonia was recognised 
on 6 April, as was Bosnia-Hercegovina, despite Bosnian 
Serb opposition.  However, the issue of recognition was 
the final factor to drive Bosnia to a war it was capable 
of pursuing:  Bosnia held over sixty percent of the 
former Yugoslavia's military industries on its territory, 
sixty percent of which were located in Croat or Muslim 
regions. (l29) 
     On 27 April l992, the 'rump' of Yugoslavia, or 
Serbia and Montenegro, and the Bosnian Serbs claimed to 
succeed to the legal and political personality of the 
former federal state. However, the U.N. and C.S.C.E. (or 
O.S.C.E.) determined that the former federal state of 
Yugoslavia had ceased to exist (l30), and invited them to 
re-apply for membership.  While there was no doubt that 
Serbian and Montenegran territory remained the subject of 
international rights and duties, the continued 
participation of Serbia-Montenegro in international 
organisations was used effectively to moderate its 
actions with respect to the now-erupted war in Bosnia. 
(l3l) 
     Finally, and after nearly four years of ethnic 
massacres and other war crimes, and gross violations of 
human rights during armed conflict, international efforts 
to negotiate a peace settlement which would respect the 
international personality and territorial intetegrity of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina succeeded, when the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina was 
initialled in Dayton, Ohio on 2l November l995 by the 
states and entities engaged in the Bosnian armed 
conflict. (l32)  The Dayton negotiations came about after 
a final brutal offensive by the Bosnian Serbs in July 
l995, in particular against the enclave of Srebrenica, an 
area declared a safe haven by the U.N. Security Council 
on l6 April l993 in Resolution 8l9.  This final push in 
turn provoked a series of Nato air raids. (l33)  The U.S. 
took control of the negotiations, amidst allegations of a 
European-led failure to find a solution, and a 'managed' 
collapse of Unprofor to make way for U.S. diplomatic and 
military initiatives. (l34)   
     In August and September l995, a joint Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serb delegation were 
induced to negotiate preliminary agreements, which in 
turn led to the Dayton proximity talks in November.  The 
Framework Agreement which resulted is roughly divided 
into arrangements which involve international 
organisations, some individual states (including three of 
the five successor states to the former Yugoslavia), 
side-letters, and Annexes.  The Annexes to the Agreement 
subdivide into two basic categories:  those regarding 
international transitional arrangements, e.g., military 
and police aspects of the peace settlement (Annexes l-A 
and ll), and those on Bosnian constitutional 
arrangements, which include an agreement on human rights 
(Annex 6) and an agreement on refugees and displaced 
persons (Annex 7). 
     The continuing roles of all the international forces 
and organs (e.g., IFOR, Council of Europe) indicated in 
the Framework Agreement point to strong external control 
over the peace process, which includes financial 
arrangements.  In particular, this supervision has been 
termed a 'government in parallel' (l35), and there 
appears to be growing apprehension regarding its ultimate 
success.  In particular, the continued defiance of many 
indicted war criminals, and strains within the Alliance 
generally regarding the U.S. troop pull-out scheduled for 
the end of l996 have increased apprehension regarding the 
success of elections planned for Bosnia in September. 
(l36) 
  
     3.  The laws of war 
     As previously noted, the nature of armed hostilities 
must be assessed in order to invoke the appropriate level 
of IHL rules.  For example, the hostilities waged until 
recently for the territorial and political domination of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which for purposes of brevity is the 
main focus of this section, would appear territorially to 
have been a 'civil' war.  Had the armed hostilities been 
viewed as a domestic armed conflict, as asserted 
primarily by Serbia throughout the conflict, the legal 
obligations of the parties to the conflict through 
observation of IHL legal rules would have been reduced to 
the minimal standards and humanitarian protections 
contained in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions, or at a slightly higher level, those 
contained in Protocol 2 of l977. (l37)   
     As all the new Balkan entities are party to both 
Protocol l and Protocol 2 of l977 (l38), IHL rules would 
accordingly be supplemented beyond those contained in the 
l949 codifications.  Nevertheless, the sheer level of 
intensity and the duration of the fighting would have 
encouraged the parties to view themselves as Common 
Article 2 'Powers', and to bind themselves accordingly to 
the full provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 
l949 (and Protocol l).  Further, allegations of active 
assistance afforded by third states, particularly Serbia, 
to the warring Bosnian parties provoked assertions 
throughout the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina that the 
armed conflict had to be viewed as an internationalised, 
or international, armed conflict from the beginning of 
hostilities.  On this basis, IHL in full would also be 
applicable.   
     IHL in full could further have been viewed as 
applicable from the beginning of hostilities in Bosnia-
Hercegovina had the conflict been viewed as a 'people's' 
armed struggle for self-determination, which 
characterisation might have brought Protocol l of l977, 
and thus, IHL in full, into play.  The latter option, 
however, proved highly problematic. 
  
          a.  the issue of self-determination 
     Domestic armed conflicts in which IHL may be 
applicable in full are wars of self-determination. (l39)  
As regards Bosnian Serb (and Croatian Serb) claims to the 
right to use armed force to achieve self-determination, 
or national liberation as the case may be (l40), Protocol 
l Article l(4) extends IHL provisions in full to wars 
which arise from situations of 'colonial domination and 
alien occupation and ... racist regimes'.  Protocol l 
also makes explicit reference to Resolution 2625, which 
arguably may be construed to bring the Bosnian 
hostilities within the ambit of Protocol l Article l(4), 
and hence, IHL in full, in a non-colonial situation. 
(l4l) 
     However, when requested to consider the issue, the 
E.C. Arbitration Commission ruled that the doctrine of 
uti possidetis prevented any further unravelling of the 
new republics.  In coming to its conclusion, the 
Commission relied in general terms on frameworks of 
analysis applicable to colonial situations, in order to 
delineate an entitlement to self-determination in non-
colonial situations, as follows.  'True' minorities can 
be distinguished from 'peoples' established in 
territorially defined administrative units of a federal 
nature, as '(i)n the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, the former boundaries acquire the character of 
borders protected by international law'. (l42)  The 
Commission thus interpreted the right to self-
determination of the Bosnian (and Croatian) Serbs to mean 
full political participation in an existing entity.   
     It would thus appear that IHL in full could not be 
made applicable to the Bosnian armed conflict on the 
basis of Protocol l Article l(4); nor could IHL in full 
be made applicable to the Bosnian conflict solely on the 
basis of allegations of active third state involvement.  
On the other hand, the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal 
convened in The Hague on the authority of the Security 
Council has authority to prosecute persons from all the 
warring parties who were responsible for serious 
violations of IHL committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since l99l. (l43)  Prosecutable 
offences include the 'grave breaches' listed in the l949 
Geneva Conventions, but not those contained in Protocol 
l.  It is of interest that the statute of the Hague 
tribunal makes no mention of Protocol l, yet the list of 
prosecutable offences goes far beyond the minimal 
provisions applicable to a Common Article 3 or Protocol 2 
'civil' war situation.  Furthermore, instituting an 
international war crimes tribunal on the basis of 
prosecuting 'war crimes' perpetrated during a 'civil' war 
would have been highly problematic, as such minimal 
levels of IHL rules contain no provision for 
international jurisdiction over 'grave breaches' or 'war 
crimes'. (l44)  
     The U.N. action taken in convening the Yugoslav war 
crimes tribunal in The Hague indicates that the 
international community considers the war in Bosnia-
Hercegovnia to have been an international armed 
conflict.  On this basis, it would appear that the 
international community assessed the 'type' of war which 
occurred in Bosnia-Hercegovina within frameworks more 
germane to those utilised during an era in which 
neutrality law was fully operable, rather than (or 
arguably, as much as) within U.N. juxtapositions of 
'aggressor' and 'victim' states.  In other words, a 
factual situation of belligerency was assessed as 
endangering international peace and security by means of 
the scale, intensity, and duration of the conflict, and 
the way in which the war was fought. 
  
          b.  the disregard of IHL in the post-l945 era 
     The double scrutiny applied in the post-l945 era 
between the jus contra bellum and the jus in bello 
denotes separate and distinct legal considerations. 
(l45)  In view of the restraint mandated in U.N. Charter 
Article 2(4), the jus contra bellum allows the merits of 
an armed conflict to be assessed.  However, though the 
use or threat of force between states is 'restrained' by 
the U.N. Charter, the issue of IHL rules remains relevant 
should armed hostilities occur, as the jus in bello 
contains legal standards which are to be applied to and 
by each party to the armed hostilities, regardless of the 
merits of the armed conflict.   
     However, IHL provides for international scrutiny 
over the use of armed force only during international 
wars which are recognised as such. (l46)  Domestic armed 
conflicts remain largely self-regulating, and IHL does 
not apply in 'peacetime'.  Thus, the premature 
recognition of the new states in the former territory of 
Yugoslavia and the degree of international intervention 
involved throughout the duration of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina are not only of interest for purposes 
of comparison with nineteenth century neutrality law, but 
further, reveal a new ordering of these two areas of 
international law.   
     It is no longer an arguable point that the new 
Balkan states were recognised as independent prematurely 
in order to facilitate international control over the 
hostilities which unfolded as a result of the dissolution 
of the former Yugoslavia. (l47)  The international 
reaction which could have been predicted during the age 
of the law of neutrality, on the other hand, would have 
been the reverse:  a recognition by third states of the 
fact of a belligerency did not for example constitute a 
recognition of Confederate independence during the 
American Civil War, nor was the implementation of the law 
of neutrality a pretext to involvement in the 
hostilities; the reason for a war was less important at 
that time than the way in which it was fought, and it 
thus becomes more clear why the laws of war were 
initially developed during this era.   
     Moreover, it might appear that any political 
uncertainty today regarding the purpose underlying the 
use or threat of armed force affords an opportunity to 
downgrade the importance of the laws of armed conflict.  
In other words, the level of protection provided through 
observance of IHL may be greatly undermined by 
disagreement regarding the more 'fundamental' issue of 
the nature of the use of force, which positioning 
effectively relegates the observance of IHL to one of 
secondary political-legal importance.  It is in this way 
that many domestic and international situations of armed 
conflict are treated as 'emergency situations', or 
'public order exercises' with correspondingly lower 
levels of protection afforded to those involved in them 
than might otherwise be the case were IHL implemented 
from the beginning of hostilities. 
     This modern prioritised, or relative, positioning of 
the jus contra bellum and the jus in bello may in turn 
influence U.N. decision-making regarding action taken in 
pursuance of collective security.  It is thus at the 
point of IHL applicability that the potential for 
politicising the relevant frameworks of analysis within 
which to assess, or justify, the use of force becomes 
evident.  A recognition that IHL rules are applicable 
constitutes evidence of the existence of an armed 
conflict.  The fact of an armed conflict raises in turn 
the need to provide some rationale or justification for 
the initial use of armed force in order to escape 
international censure.   
     While a disregard for IHL in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since l99l has led to the convening of 
a war crimes tribunal at The Hague, it remains 
speculative whether practices such as 'ethnic cleansing' 
occurred because political considerations underlying 
assessments of the jus contra bellum clouded the more 
factual issue of the application of the jus in bello - 
when the two should remain separate and equal.  
Conversely, as a modern IHL allows states to pay less 
attention to the way in which 'civil' wars are fought, 
the fault - such as it may lie - appears locatable in the 
level of state co-operation to be expected by states 
where their mutual interests are not at stake. 
     Nevertheless, where the very nature of an armed 
conflict is in question, and hence the level of IHL to be 
observed by the parties to it, a high degree of normative 
confusion may result regarding the substance of the 
rights and duties to be made operable by the 
belligerents.  This point, coupled with the reduced 
scrutiny afforded to domestic, or 'civil' armed conflicts 
by modern IHL codifications in turn reflects the 
inequalities present in the international community 
regarding the 'right' to use armed force.  In turn, any 
uncertainty as to the true nature of the relevant 
hostilities affords third states the option to declare 
neutrality and to maintain what could otherwise be 
characterised as normal relations - including trade links 
- with the warring parties. 
  
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
     There are of course many differences in nineteenth 
and twentieth century legal frameworks within which to 
view peace and war, not the least of which is the change 
in attitude towards the use of armed force.  Thus, the 
fact that the law of neutrality was developed as a tool 
of state economic and political survival during a time in 
which war was not prohibited cannot be disregarded.   
     With the huge expansion in war technology by the end 
of the nineteenth century, the means and methods of 
warfare needed to be harnessed, controlled, and made more 
humane as to their use, as the purpose of war at the time 
was to weaken the enemy to the point of surrender. (l48)  
Thus, the Hague Conventions of l899 and l907 codified the 
existing laws of war, and further incorporated the rules 
of neutrality.  Alongside developments in the laws of war 
grew the complimentary but distinct Geneva Conventions.   
     Yet, the development of a predominately nineteenth 
century law of neutrality began to falter at the point of 
its codification at The Hague.  New weaponry facilitated 
the rise of the doctrine of 'total war', a doctrine which 
favoured the targetting of anything or anyone which could 
fuel the war effort of the belligerents.  This naturally 
made a stance of neutrality increasingly difficult to 
maintain.   
     Developments in the laws of war, too, began to 
falter during the time of the League of Nations.  While 
this situation was to change in l949 with developments in 
the Geneva Conventions, the position is different as 
regards any  modernisation of a law of neutrality in 
tandem with IHL.  On the contrary, the new provisions in 
the U.N. Charter regarding the maintenance of 
international peace and security, including those 
provisions which deal with collective security, leave the 
present relevance of neutrality law very much in 
question.  Nevertheless, the factual situation in which 
the law of neutrality developed and provided the tools of 
state survival during armed conflicts survives.  
Individual states, faced with a frequently deadlocked 
international organisation, continue to decide for 
themselves what action is appropriate regarding 
particular situations of armed strife, including domestic 
or 'civil' wars.  However, while this would appear to be 
in exercise of the option to do so, states which continue 
to observe belligerent rights and duties are in effect 
frequently compelled to do so. (l49) 
     Nevertheless, it remains a point of speculation that 
the fundamental difference between the operation of 
traditional neutrality law and U.N. collective security 
mechanisms is that when the latter are made operable, 
states are afforded a right of involvement and 
intervention in order to rectify an international breach 
of the peace.  On the other hand, the substance of any 
duty so to act is by agreement, leaving the extent of the 
resources made available for this purpose in doubt.  
Further, while the right to aid an international 'victim' 
obviously improves its chances of survival, ample scope 
is afforded for an assisting state to impose pre-
conditions to the aid.  Conversely, should the cause of a 
post-Cold War armed conflict be locatable within 
frameworks of international public policy which find 
little favour in a U.N. whose military capacity is 
dominated by the West, the 'victim' has a reduced ability 
to acquire international assistance.  
     Civil wars are notorious for their ferocity, 
intensity, and duration.  The agriculatural Southern 
Confederacy lost its struggle for independence in l865 to 
the industrial North after a war lasting four years.  The 
Geneva Arbitration ensued, after which both the laws of 
war and of neutrality were developed.  The Popular Front 
government of Spain lost its struggle to the Franco 
Fascists in l939 after a three-year struggle.  World War 
II quickly followed, after which the Geneva Conventions 
were developed further.  The law of neutrality was 
relevant to each of these armed conflicts, and it is of 
interest that the use of force was decisive in each. 
     While it would be erroneous to draw too firm a 
conclusion from these two examples, it does appear that 
efforts made this century to prevent war have culminated 
in a post-Cold War international environment in which 
international rights of intervention in the Yugoslav 
dissolution conflicts could be made operable, achieving 
in the process impressive levels of political and 
ideological compliance in the new states.  The Hague war 
crimes tribunal may also lend credence to these new post-
Cold War efforts, as well as the many provisons in the 
Dayton Framework Agreement to promote and strengthen 
respect for human rights. 
     Nevertheless, international involvement in the 
domestic affairs of what had been a federal socialist 
Yugoslav state continues to raise some alarm at several 
points.  The situation in l990 was such that the Belgrade 
government could have expected to receive international 
support in order to preserve its political independence 
and territorial integrity.  In l99l, domestic law was not 
complied with when Slovenia and Croatia declared 
independence.  The European Community, through its 
premature recognition of the independence of the new 
Balkan entities, effectively accelerated the dissolution 
of the former Yugoslavian state, and the descent of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina into a four-year war.  The subsequent 
indecisiveness of action adopted by the international 
community did little more than help to prolong the 
conflict.   
     Neutrality law accepted that aid rendered to a 
belligerent invites retaliation.  This basic premise is 
occasionally perceived as relevant in more modern times, 
despite the fact that belligerents can be characterised 
as 'aggressors' and 'victims'.  Nevertheless, and in view 
of the manner of resolution of the Yugoslav dissolution 
wars, any differences in efficacy between an impartial 
law of neutrality and a highly partial U.N. in preserving 
and restoring peace and security appear to be 
increasing.    
                                      Elizabeth Chadwick 
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been a Party (Washington, Government Printing Office, 
l898), i. pp. 653 - 59. Britain, in turn, was given 
approximately $7,430,000, of which $5,500,500 arose from 
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